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Abstract  
Studies of housing systems lying in the ‘middle ground’ between state and market are subject 
to three important shortcomings. First, the widely used Esping-Andersen approach assesses 
only a subset of the key housing outcomes and may be less helpful for describing changes in 
housing policy regimes. Second, there is too much emphasis on tenure transitions, and an 
assumed close correspondence between tenure labels and effective system functioning may 
not be valid. Third, due attention has not been given to the spatial dimensions in which 
housing systems operate, in particular when housing policies have a significant devolved or 
localised emphasis. Updating Esping-Andersen’s framework, we suggest a preliminary list of 
housing system indicators in order to capture the nature of the housing systems being 
developed and devolved. We verified the applicability of this indicator system with the case of 
China. This illustrates clearly the need for a more nuanced and systematic basis for 
categorising differences and changes in welfare and housing policies. 
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1. Introduction: contrasting regimes 
 
The still high growth rates of the BRICS and large numbers of Asian and African countries2, 
are not only central to recovery from austerity in the OECD economies but also underpin the 
shifting, longer term patterns of global economic power. The key issues have been widely 
debated (Jacques 2009, Stiglitz 2002) and there has been a steadily growing literature on the 
patterns and consequences of housing sector change (Maclennan et al, 2014). The story of 
housing transformation in China is well charted from the work of Zhang (2000, 2004) 
onwards and has covered accounts of market evolution (Lu, 2010) as well as reforms in the 
provision of public and affordable housing (Wang 1992, 1995; Wang and Murie 1996, 2000). 
                                                          
1 Corresponding author  
2 See O’Neill (2013) for a discussion of the expanding set of fast growing and fast urbanising, 
but currently low income, countries that are dominating GDP growth in the current 
millennium. Although growth rates have slowed into 2015 they remain high, or instance 
china is still reportedly achieving a 7 pc growth rate for 2014-15 when most affluent OECD 
countries are in the range 2 to 3pc. 
2 
However, since 2012, there has been a recurrent concern that housing market instability may 
threaten progress in China. The policy question is no longer simply the scale of the market 
sector created in China but the efficiency and stability of these new markets (see Dreger and 
Zhang, 2013; Chen et al., 2014; and Cao and Keivani, 2014). These developments, arguably, 
question the conventional tenure-based frameworks that are used to describe and categorise 
housing system change within and across countries and suggest, instead, a new emphasis on 
the functional features of the systems being created. 
 
In recent years there have been substantial attempts to place China’s housing system change 
in an international context, most notably Stephens (2010) and Wang and Murie (2011). The 
main arguments in this paper respond to and build upon the arguments of these two important 
papers. These reviews shared similar conceptual approaches but addressed different 
questions. Stephens, on the one hand, was particularly concerned with how China’s housing 
transition contrasted with transitions in Eastern Europe. Wang and Murie, on the other, used a 
detailed account of Chinese housing policy changes to argue for a new approach to 
international housing studies. Whilst they stressed that China was following a different and 
distinctive reform path, Stephens, paying due regard to both the conventional (Esping-
Andersen) welfare regimes perspective and the World Bank’s market change indicators, 
reached the opposite conclusion, that the Chinese experience was not substantively different 
from that of the former Soviet transition states.   
 
This paper shares much of the same background account of housing system change in China. 
However, at this stage, it is not primarily concerned with comparisons across different 
national housing systems. Instead the main emphasis here is to illustrate how policies change 
within a nation but set in a broader policy framework, i.e., when housing policy regimes are 
regarded as more than welfare regimes. The principle aims of this paper are two-fold. The 
first is to support Wang and Murie’s emphasis that with emerging economies and the advent 
of market oriented policy approaches, the Esping-Andersen framing exercises, which largely 
stemmed from the reform of welfare states in Western Europe prior to the 2000s, may not 
now constitute an adequate basis for understanding differences and changes in mixed housing 
systems and policies. This paper responds to Wang and Murie’s (2011) call to explore and 
describe the broad ‘middle-ground’ between state and market in national housing systems,  
but considers that the ‘neo-liberal’ label is too reductionist to satisfactorily describe system 
change. Second, having done so, we want to contrast our conclusions on China’s housing 
transformation with those of Stephens’ (2010).  
 
It is important to be clear on the conceptual limits of this paper. Firstly, like both Wang and 
Murie (2011) and Stephens (2011), we use Esping-Andersen’s (EA) categories and measures 
of change as a starting point to discuss China’s housing evolution. Secondly, whilst EA was 
devised to make contrasts across countries and over time, it is not uncommon, as in the 
studies cited here, for the conclusions about change in a single system to be referred to the 
EA categories. Clearly our study is aimed at a single system in transition over time and 
understood in that way may serve as a pilot case study for wider application to other single or 
multiple nation studies. Thirdly, this study is not intended as a theoretical departure but it is 
not atheoretical either. EA’s theoretical contribution was a high level framework for 
categorising and understanding broad changes in welfare systems. Our paper is not intended 
to challenge the broad approach of that work but is rather aimed at suggesting ways in which 
contemporary housing system change can be better described and understood.  
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Three aspects of the EA approach are identified as in need of updating in order to better 
characterise ‘middle ground’ housing regimes. First, we argue that the EA framework 
assesses only a subset of key housing outcomes. We believe a wider set of concerns need to 
be considered in managing a national housing system. Secondly, the paper argues that 
housing studies focus unduly on tenure shares, with the assumption that there is a close 
correspondence between tenure labels, system functioning and the housing outcomes. That 
correspondence cannot now be assumed and it is essential that characterising housing policies 
and policy changes are based on new housing system functioning and outcomes criteria. 
Finally, localism has become a major defining characteristic of housing policies. Here we 
take a broad view on localism, regarding it as the growing autonomies enjoyed by sub-
national and local authorities, greater freedom given to local communities and rising housing 
heterogeneities between different places within the same national state. This eclectic 
definition of localism extends its applicability out of western countries to many emerging, 
transformative states, such as China. In consequence, housing research has to have more 
regard to multiple local regimes co-existing within national spaces (Maclennan and 
O’Sullivan, 2013).  
 
These conceptual challenges are set out in Section 2. More detailed discussion of possible 
ways forward in charting housing systems and transitions are discussed in Section 3. This is 
accomplished by linking the ‘social’ regime literature and applied economics approaches, and 
connecting them to the currently neglected use of housing indicators. The application of this 
approach to the recent evolution of China is presented in Section 4. The concluding section 5 
highlights some future directions for housing studies that aligns not just with social policy 
but, broadly defined, new approaches in public management. 
 
2. Housing systems: wider outcomes, complexities and real dimensions 
 
Housing studies link different intellectual perspectives to facilitate cross-disciplinary views 
on processes and policies. Debates on housing research have largely been led by social-
political interests (Donnison, 1967; Harloe, 1985; Kemeny, 1995, Stephens, 2010) but also by 
political economy scholars such as Ball and Morrison (2000), Whitehead and Yates (2009), 
and Maclennan (2008). Malpass (2008, p2) has argued that social researchers have tended to 
view the housing sector as a creation of the welfare state and focussed on its internal 
structures rather than it’s wider connections and outcomes. Conversely, he argues, 
economists paid more attention to the housing market rather than the provision of public 
services, and stressed the wider economy connections of these systems rather than 
considering their functional, internal characteristics (though a contrasting view on housing 
economics can be found in Maclennan (1982)). As Wang and Murie now call for a new, 
broader perspective in studying housing policy regimes, there may be merit in blending these 
different ‘socio-political’ and ‘applied economic’ approaches.  
 
The social tradition in housing studies focusses on classifying broad housing policy 
approaches (or regimes) in terms of how they prioritise and address income inequalities. 
Within this tradition, there is a substantial amount of work that tries to categorise the varieties 
of welfare states (for example, Titmuss (1974) and Donnison (1967)), which in turn support 
their observation and comparison of different systems. Among this rich literature, EA’s long 
established categories of social regimes (democratic, corporatist and liberal), are typically 
linked by housing researchers with different housing arrangements (such as Hoekstra, 2003). 
Social democratic approaches involve the removal of housing allocation from the market 
mechanism, the delinking of rents paid and dwelling costs, the removal of speculative and 
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supernormal profits from land and housing provision systems, as well as a state commitment 
to house and co-locate a wide spectrum of income groups. Corporatist approaches recognise 
more diverse routes to housing support for poorer households, such as the family, the church 
and other charitable means and are also associated with less radical redistributive objectives 
and lean towards supporting the broad status quo. Liberal regimes are associated with 
households making consumption decisions within markets and (usually) limited income 
redistribution (via non-earmarked supports) to the less well off. 
 
EA’s categorisation framework is consistent with, and been used by, a range of theoretical 
perspectives. Similarly, there are different ways of not only defining the ‘middle-ground’ but 
also describing and interpreting it. The approach adopted here is derived from the published 
(European) housing studies literature, which is primarily shaped by interests in social policy 
and poverty; and the analyses of housing economics, which have usually addressed wider 
aspects of housing systems. We emphasise housing economics as political economy, 
recognising that market and non-market failures and monopolies exist and that income 
distributional outcomes matter. Markets can be studied and their shifts described without 
implying approval of outcomes and their changes. This underpins our interest in better 
description of market change than usually involved in the typical application of EA. It also 
draws upon (the now quite old) new public management approach that emphasises how assets 
and systems are managed (and not just owned) and aligned with outcomes, and hence the 
interest here in moving away from tenure (asset ownership) as being the lead descriptor of 
system change. The final theoretical connection is to link analysis of system change to the 
emergence of understandings of localism/devolution in housing policy autonomies 
(Maclennan and O’Sullivan, 2013) that are currently leading to more significant regional and 
metropolitan differences within national systems. Of course recognising multiple market 
outcomes, varieties of structures and roles within a housing system, and territorial differences 
within nations suggest need for a renewed multi-country understanding of contemporary, 
cross-national housing system change. But that task lies well beyond the scope of this paper. 
Indeed, we also recognise that more, multiple, synoptic measures of change need to be 
developed and calibrated for more detailed analysis in China. This paper offers first step 
rather than final strides into the ‘middle ground’. These issues are addressed below. 
 
2.1 All the big outcomes 
 
A singular focus on the social objectives of housing policies bears the danger of neglecting 
how regimes are formed and modified to address significant environmental and economic 
consequences of housing outcomes. Housing policies are not driven solely by beliefs about 
the required extent and best means of income redistribution. The modern context for housing 
policies, that Wang and Murie want to address, is a public management framework that seeks 
to align specific sector policies, such as housing, health and education, to impact upon a 
range of major policy outcomes, such as economic competitiveness, environmental 
sustainability, wellbeing, market failures as well as income redistribution. Detailed 
explanation on the interfaces between housing and all these different dimensions falls beyond 
the scope of this paper. Instead, attention here is given to the social and economic aspects of 
housing which are discussed further in section 3.  
 
Acemoglou and Robinson (2013) have argued, in relation to economic policy measures, that 
apparently partial policy changes may have to be adapted in order to maintain functioning 
political coalitions. Social policies are similarly adapted so that the multiple dimensions of 
policy require simultaneous analysis. Different kinds of housing system outcomes proliferate 
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when broader ranges of policies are subjected to political trade-offs. National administrations 
may choose to shift away from redistributive measures associated with economic policy 
whilst still wishing to achieve fairer social objectives. For instance, prior to the GFC, both the 
governments of the UK and France were committed to expanding non-market housing 
provision to promote social inclusion at the same time as their economic strategy measures 
were becoming more market oriented. Equally social goals can shift without changing 
economic policies. In the BRICS countries there has, since 2000, been a rising commitment 
to the reduction of inadequate housing for the poor whilst economic growth has remained the 
predominant policy goal and with housing policy increasingly seen as part of more widely 
defined economic development packages (Maclennan et al, 2014).  
 
This is important for two reasons. First, as noted above, housing policy regimes have to be 
understood in relation to how they impact all the multiple, major goals of a policy and not 
just social policies. Secondly, the existing theoretical framework amplified by the EA 
approach, seems to offer most clarity about the extreme cases, of pure socialism and free 
markets, which rarely occur. Real political economies and diverse policy outcomes from 
good housing provision gives scope for much more complex policy stances to emerge, so that 
theorising the ‘middle ground’ – to paraphrase Wang and Murie (2011) – is not only 
challenging but central to the task on hand. The existence of hybrid goals of policy in western 
economies, reducing welfare states, and emerging BRICS suggests strongly that the real 
conceptual and empirical effort in housing research has to lie in developing ways of 
describing change within the ‘middle ground’.  
 
2.2 Tenures are crude system proxies 
 
A second concern with the reductionism of the EA framework is the focus on housing tenure. 
Cuts in the share of public housing are usually interpreted as a weakening of a social 
democratic commitment to income redistribution, community participation and 
neighbourhood diversity. When other system outcomes, such as the cost and effectiveness of 
service provision and the potential monopoly problems of public ownership are recognised, 
then the reduction in public housing provision may have the opposite effect. In some settings, 
the move to more pluralistic forms of rental provision and more diverse tenure options in 
poorer neighbourhoods may have a more potent, positive redistribution capacity3. In some 
European countries, such as Spain, Norway and Ireland, the private rental sector, through the 
use of housing allowances to tenants, is increasingly sharing the responsibility of social 
housing and housing ownership sectors in meeting the needs of low income households and 
immigrants (Jones et al., 2012).  
 
There is a strong case for arguing, that indicators of system functioning, rather than tenures, 
are the key to tracking transition (see Section 3 below). However, the default position for 
housing studies is to revert to tenure transitions (see, for instance, Wang and Murie, 2011 and 
Boehm and Schlottmann (2014)). This dichotomisation is both too imprecise and too 
aggregative to proxy housing policy effects on social outcomes. Market and non-market 
systems are defined not just by the property ownership but also by how they plan, design, 
produce, price, manage and allocate housing. It is the functional features of systems, not 
                                                          
3 A universal failure of public housing is not being argued here. However a case can be made 
that in some settings a move from public to non-profit ownership may have net benefits in the 
long term wellbeing of the poor and, inconsequence, reliance on public tenure shares as an 
indicator of social redistribution is misleading. 
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aggregate tenures that need to be analysed within countries and contrasted across them. An 
80 percent home ownership rate does not mean the same in Norway, Greece and China, 
especially in relation to redistribution objectives.  
 
2.3 Big outcomes, but local regimes 
 
A third difficulty is that housing policy regimes for most nation states involve not just  
national government but the approaches of provincial, regional and municipal levels. Where 
autonomies in housing policies are distributed across different orders of government, political 
choices (Esping-Andersen) and cultural/ideological differences (Kemeny) that shape regime 
choices for low income housing provision may differ from region to region. Local ‘regimes’ 
are discussed in Cochrane et.al. (2001). Cross-jurisdictional diversity in housing polices is 
usually lost in the reductionism of national level descriptions. 
 
The distribution of different autonomies across orders of government is not a minor detail of 
housing policies but one of their defining features. Housing outcomes are usually driven by 
multiple level interventions that must all, eventually, play out in local housing systems. Local 
regimes matter in housing, planning and land policies. There is, then, the possibility, 
especially in larger complex states, that the policy aims and regimes of local governments 
may be different from, and run counter to, those of the national state. The impacts of multiple 
regimes are most likely to be apparent where national and local governments have defined, 
separate, functional responsibilities. Maclennan et al. (2014) note that social goals for 
housing are more widely embedded in India and Brazil within local rather than national 
government. This is reflected both in the markedly high income inequality indices for both 
countries and in the low share of GNP devoted to social protection programmes. National 
governments in Brazil have been more concerned with the financial and macroeconomic 
aspects of housing until this millennium. 
  
China is different. After a mass marketisation in the 1990s, social policy aims, including 
housing measures driven by the national government, returned to prominence in the first 
decade of this century (Chen, Yang and Wang 2014). This emphasis on social concerns by 
the highest level of government is increasingly rare in modern housing policies, not least after 
the GFC. Whereas variety in choice of policy regime arises from differences in economic 
development, culture and ideology or practical politics, the existence of regional and local 
differences means that typifying ‘Chinese’ or ‘British’ approaches to housing policies is 
always problematic. Housing policy emphases are not the same in Hong Kong or Beijing, nor 
in England and Scotland. And this intra-national regime diversity becomes a salient issue the 
greater the growth of local autonomies in housing and social policies (Maclennan and 
O’Sullivan, 2013). Within and across nations, housing system change needs to be described 
with real system indicators that capture regional variety. This is particularly true when we 
move from a ‘social policy’ to an ‘urban policy’ perspective on housing studies.  
 
3. Tracking housing system change 
 
Commentators, including Stephens (2010) and Wang and Murie (2011), recognise some of 
these limitations. Yet regime change assessments tend to begin and end with international 
contrasts of overall tenure change. A more system-oriented approach could be achieved by 
linking the EA ‘social’ regime literature and applied economics approaches that involve the 
use of housing indicators.  This may seem an obvious approach but few studies of housing 
differences and changes have used statistical rigour to explore transitions, and the use of 
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housing indicators, promoted by UNCHS since the early 1990s (Angel et al. 1993) has waxed 
and waned. Even fewer studies have explained explicitly the sequence through which policy 
actions, comprising the policy regime, are linked to changes in housing outputs and, in 
association with other policy activities, to broader policy outcomes. Local housing planning 
approaches that undertake extensive local housing system analyses rarely develop summary 
system outcome indicators. City/urban performance measures, such as the annual ‘Cities 
Outlook’ published by the Centre for Cities in the UK, are also notably weak in relation to 
characterising housing outcomes. In consequence, regime change and housing outcome 
analysis is still at an early stage in the use of statistical approaches. This paper does not, 
obviously, produce a definitive, extensive description of a housing system. But it illustrates, 
with selected indicators and case study, how a more rigorous approach might develop. 
 
Data availability over longer periods is a key limitation in constructing a comprehensive 
framework. This is not only because countries tend to measure different things, but even 
when they seek to track similar outcomes, their definitions may vary considerably. In order to 
illustrate what current approaches tend to miss, this section will discuss ‘ideal’ ways in which 
housing transition might be better described, whilst recognising the limits of what can be 
presently done. We draw upon the (now almost historic) World Bank Housing Indicators 
Program, which included ten key indicators to measure five major housing outcomes, 
including price, quantity, quality, demand and supply (Angel et al. 1993, p23). We 
nevertheless differ from the above in two respects: first, while the Indicators Program 
focussed entirely upon market outcomes, we seek to conjoin its economic consideration with 
a fuller articulation of EA’s social approach. Therefore the indicators chosen included not 
only tenures, but also proxies for changes in the operational features of both market and non-
market sectors. Demonstrating this framework in China (section 4), we show that promoting 
home-ownership and the creation of effective market systems are not the same thing. In 
consequence, simply tracking the changing private/public tenure balance says little about the 
nature of the systems being created. Second, we try to position housing policy within the 
wider policy system and outline a tentative action-outcome trajectory that is largely missing 
in the Indicator Program. Together, the plausible indicators have to confront how systems are 
actually organized and splits between market and hierarchy in organising production, as well 
as how key housing outcomes relate to income and wellbeing (Maclennan and More 1997). 
Figure 1 illustrates our conceptual framework as well as some of the key indicators to be 
used.  
 
 
Insert Figure 1 here: Conceptual framework of housing system indicators 
 
 
To show how this conceptual framework is helpful in understanding the ‘middle ground’, it is 
beneficial to start with the extreme cases: the ideal ‘non-market’ and ‘market’ systems. The 
non-market system refers to a pure socialist approach where market allocation and pricing 
functions have been removed; whereas the pure market system, similar to the liberal regime 
described by Esping-Andersen, comprises lightly regulated or unfettered markets allocating 
resources through price signals and in which the roles of government and redistribution are 
limited. Pure ‘market’ and ‘non-market’ regimes now exist only as theoretical ideas.   
 
Based on the key indicators suggested in figure 1, a primarily non-market housing system 
will have the key features of: 
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1) Tenure structure: public ownership of housing is most commonly associated with non-
market approaches to provision. However public tenure share does not provide an 
adequate proxy for how ‘welfare’ is produced and distributed, not least in tenant 
involvement in key decision making processes. A further qualification is that non-market 
provision may also be delivered by non-state providers such as housing associations 
(Maclennan and Chisholm, 2013), and there is the possibility that non-profits may 
become ‘hybrid’ organisations that deliver both for-profit and non-profit housing. In 
addition, where households find shelter in private rental housing there may be significant 
controls on rents that either suspends or modifies the market pricing mechanism (Scanlon 
and Whitehead, 2008). It can be expected that nowadays governments use a mix of these 
very different mechanisms to deliver adequate low-income rental housing, so identifying 
transitions requires knowledge of these different provision systems.  
2) Distribution: regardless of the particular forms and structures of ownership, or degree of 
‘public’ monopoly in provision and distribution, the criteria for property allocation are 
critical in non-market systems. We would expect housing and other state benefits to be 
allocated according to a social rationing hierarchy instead of purchasing power. The real 
experiences of social housing systems in these regards, and how they would deliver 
‘welfare’, are again not well proxied by tenure. 
3) Subsidies: State and non-profit housing provision involves production subsidies that may 
simply appear in the government budget or as grants or subsidised loans to provision 
entities; subsidies to low income households in private markets could be delivered 
through income related housing allowances. The cost of mortgage guarantees provided by 
governments are often important ‘subsidies’ in systems with large home-owner sectors 
but are usually invisible in government accounts and cross-system contrasts. The tax 
treatment of housing production, mortgages and other costs may also be significant. Small 
or falling budgets for non-profit housing do not per se indicate a withdrawal of housing 
related support, so the key indicators are how the overall per capita level of combined 
housing subsidy and housing tax expenditures are, and how their distribution across 
socio-economic groups changes as systems transform.  
4) Regulation and supply chain: Non-market providers also have to choose the key systems 
that design, plan, build, price, maintain, manage and renew homes; pure state housing 
systems would internalise all these activities. Land would be provided by the state, they 
would use state construction enterprises and materials, pricing would reflect 
administrative charges, maintenance decisions would also lie with the state, and providers 
neither buy nor sell properties in the market. Within each ‘social’ sector it is important to 
establish patterns of ‘market and hierarchy’ in provision and how they are changing 
(Maclennan and More, 1997). 
5) Finance: Expenditure to support non-market housing would be sourced directly from the 
state budget without any use of private finance; rents in non-market provision are 
(usually) set by administrative rules that vary from country to country, indeed from 
municipality to municipality. Key questions are how the mix of public/private finance 
changes over time and how the extent to which administered rents falls below market 
rents changes   
 
A primarily market-based system would, by way of contrast, rely on market driven demand 
and supply responses. However it is important, in principle, not to confuse reliance on a 
market mechanism within the housing sector with a minimal commitment to subsidised 
housing outcomes. Governments can choose to use markets for social policy (arguably 
welfare) ends rather than simply accept market outcomes free of subsidy. Some countries 
may choose broadly progressive and high levels of housing support through market 
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mechanisms, for example Norway. Others may inject substantial tax expenditures and 
subsidies, usually the former, and generate quite regressive outcomes (such as the USA). 
Building, planning and other regulations within market systems may be either weak or strong 
depending on whether governments see the market as a device to be used or a system to be 
‘obeyed’. Just as public systems have to interface in complex ways with markets for finance, 
materials, labour and services, the market systems are required to act within regulatory 
frameworks for land, mortgages and construction that might be more or less strong in 
constraining supplier-consumer behaviour. Market and non-market tenure shares say 
relatively little about the housing policy intentions of governments across space and time, 
unless there is some understanding of the operational features of markets, including key 
regulations, and the ways in which they are managed.   
 
Corresponding to these broad indicators for the non-market system, key indicators for the 
market sector include: 
 
1) Tenure structure: usually dominated by private home-ownership, but there are still, even 
increasingly, likely to be significant private renting sectors, often with involvement of 
small scale ‘individual’ landlords. Small renters would be the norm compared to the more 
organised, professional housing associations.  
2) Distribution: market mechanisms play the most fundamental roles in shaping what is 
produced and who occupies what.  
3) Subsidies: State subsidies in market systems may take diverse forms, such as tax subsidy, 
but not through below-market-price disposal of state housing assets. There is not always a 
progressive pattern of housing subsidies. Housing market separations of different income 
groups is widely prevalent and socially accepted. 
4) Regulation and supply chain: Land use planning, with land usually owned by private 
providers, may be more or less strict and more or less attuned to economic, social and 
environmental goals. Planning systems that wish to emphasise economic responsiveness 
and favour elastic supply responses are likely to be relatively weak with limited state 
powers to intervene in land markets (Malpezzi and Mayo, 1997). Large scale turnover or 
second-hand private supply features in relation to new construction with a well-developed 
real estate pricing and transfer sector. 
5) Finance: The spread, sources, terms, costs (relative to key base interest rates) and 
regulation of mortgage finance are key features of housing market systems. In emerging 
countries, such as Brazil, mortgage finance may less than a fifth of purchases and even in 
some higher income countries, most notably Italy, family and non-market mortgage 
sources may be important. Loan finance for mortgages may be sourced quite directly 
from the capital market or through the banking system. A key aspect of these systems is 
the extent to which main mortgage rates are at a premium above base interest rates, and 
whether fiscal instruments influence that gap. Governments, concerned about housing and 
financial sector stability, regulate mortgage lending terms, such as the maximum length of 
loans, loan to income, loan to value ratios and the key features of equity withdrawal 
products. Transformation of these features is typical in economic development, although 
in quite different ways. Financial sector deregulation and asset (housing wealth) based 
welfare are the major policy shifts nowadays (Kemeny,1995; Schwartz & Seabrooke, 
2008; Smith and Searle 2010), which have significant implication both for the wellbeing 
and suitability of market choices for lower income households and the financing of 
welfare for the elderly. They are important aspects of housing differences and changes.  
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These cameo descriptions of ‘public’ and ‘market’ systems portrayed above characterise the 
‘extreme’ scenarios that lie at the opposite ends of the EA spectrum of social-democratic, 
corporate and liberal regimes. We are not here proposing new EA categories but focussing on 
describing housing systems that lie-between the prototype categories and using selected key 
indicators to do so. In line with Aalbers and Christophers (2014) and Barlow and Duncan 
(1988), we regard housing tenure as hardly sufficient to define these ‘ideal’ systems, let alone 
the more complicated hybrid forms. Furthermore, when housing transitions are ongoing, it is 
essential not simply to chart the emerging extent of market tenures, but to understand the 
failures and efficiencies of these markets in terms of how tax, subsidy and planning powers 
are used (or not) to deliver social and other national housing policy goals which are critical to 
‘wellbeing’. In this regard, our interpretation of the ‘middle ground’ is broadened to include 
not only those static profiles displayed by indicators, but also how the system is evolving and 
moving from one ‘pole’ to another.   
 
The indicator framework we constructed is a simple one, yet the direction we are trying to 
point to – linking ‘social’ regime with applied economics via housing indicators – is far from 
easy, especially in empirical studies. In order to test the applicability of this conceptual work 
in real life, we applied it in the case of China, as this country is undergoing major housing 
system transformations from a state housing regime to somewhere in between.  
 
4. Evolution of the Chinese housing system  
 
Good accounts of housing system transition in China already exist, and there is consent of the 
close relationship between China’s housing policy choices and its wider economic and social 
development rationales (Chen 2009; Lu 2010; Wang and Murie 1996, 2000; Wang et al. 
2012; Wang and Shao, 2014). In Maclennan et al. (2014), China’s long journey towards 
housing reconstruction was broadly divided into four stages: 1) The ‘experimental period’ 
between 1978 and 1988, when China’s initiatives in economic reform was set as the wider 
background, and its state housing system was incrementally transformed nearer to the social-
democratic regime; 2) the ‘two-track’ period in the next decade, which is perhaps the most 
interesting period, as it contained non-market (sustained public work-unit housing), social 
democratic (disposal of state housing) and corporate regimes (emerging private housing). 
This seemingly contradictory combination reflected governments’ concerns for social unrest 
on the one hand, and the time needed for reforms in other complementary sectors to 
accomplish on the other (Wang and Murie 1996); 3) the ‘Marketisation’ period from 1998 to 
2010, when China moved away from its socialist legacy and embraced the market system, 
which was partially fuelled by the need to boost domestic demand to recover from the Asian 
financial crisis and; 4) the ‘Rebounding period after 2010, since when there has been a 
noticeable shift from private homeownership to a renewed interest in public rental housing 
provision. But this should not be regarded as moving backwards as argued by Chen et al. 
(2014, p547), but an acknowledgment of the ‘complexity of urban housing systems in a 
modern market economy’.  
 
China’s incremental transformation makes it difficult to pigeonhole this country into 
conventional regime categories (see Doling, 1999; Stephens 2010; Wang et al. 2012). This 
difficulty, as illustrated in section 2, is partly resulted from the poorly articulated ‘middle 
ground’. Conversely, China also provides a good example to study the middle ground, and 
demonstrates the applicability of our conceptual framework. In what follows, we will 
illustrate the use of this framework to identify the shifting profile of China’s housing system, 
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while recognise the potential interregional diversities in housing configurations and de facto 
regimes.  
 
4.1 De-commodification  
Tenure: Before reform, housing in China was regarded as a core part of the state welfare 
system, so heavily-subsided public rental housing dominated its housing tenure structures 
from the 1960s. Since the mid-1990s, homeownership has increased sharply. By August 
2013, the urban homeownership rate had reached 87% (China Household Finance Survey 
2014). Private renting, however, only emerged after the 2000s, promoted mainly by renting 
agencies. Nevertheless, renting is gaining popularity among the under 30s. According to a 
survey by Ganji Net (2013), a widely used trading website, some 77% of those under 30s 
lived in rental accommodation, but they tended to start thinking of buying when they were 
about to form a family.    
 
Regional differences were more noticeable at the start of China’s reform, as different regions 
inherited different industrial structures. Figure 2 compares the housing tenures between 
Guangxi, Shaanxi and Chongqing in West China, Hunan, Hubei and Henan in Central China, 
Liaoning and Jilin in Northeast China, and Beijing, Shanghai, Guangdong in East China in 
2000. Across these examples, purchasing former public housing, renting public housing and 
self-built homes were the three most important housing sources. Inter-regionally, purchasing 
former public housing was highest in Liaoning, Hubei and Beijing, where state-owned 
factories used to dominant the local economy. Renting featured significantly in East China 
where purchase prices were much higher. Self-built housing stood out in Guangdong and 
most inland provinces, which might reflect the more dynamic local economy in the former 
and more readily available land in the latter.   
 
 
Insert Figure 2 here: Compositions of housing sources in selected regions, 2000 
 
 
Housing price has become the most important factor in tenure choice, and the transition to 
homeownership is increasingly driven by market forces (supply-demand balance) instead of 
social needs. Figure 3 shows the homeownership rates in the capital cities of these provinces. 
The huge increase in homeownership compared to 2000 (Fig 2) has partly resulted from the 
sale of public housing to residents at discounted prices and partly arisen from the termination 
of large-scale work-unit housing supply. Cities in the east tended to have lower ownership 
rates because they had larger demand, less developable land and more restrictive housing 
purchase regulations. Such demand-supply imbalances had pushed housing price beyond 
many households’ affordability limits. 
 
 
Insert Figure 3 here: Homeownership rates in selected cities in 2012 
 
 
Distribution:  In the socialist system, the centralised control of public housing meant that a 
few powerful people could impact the distribution process (see Wang and Marie 1996). The 
commodification reforms in China have resulted in parallel commercial-social distribution 
systems similar to those in developed countries, except that its social housing, instead of 
being residual, shows signs of resurgence in recent years (Chen et al., 2014) Individual 
household is responsible for reporting their housing needs to local authorities. Qualified 
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households are then added to a ‘needs bank’, and a lottery draw selects who is offered what 
and where (Chen, Yang and Wang, 2014).  
There is smaller regional variation in commercial housing distribution compared to social 
housing, as the distribution criteria for social housing could be tailored by the regional 
authorities. In Beijing, for example, qualified applicants for the Economic and Comfortable 
Housing (ECH) should have obtained local household status for at least three years and meet 
other criteria related to income, average living floor space and age. In Chongqing, local 
household status is not required. For Public Rental Housing (PRH), the regulatory loophole is 
even bigger, so local variations in criteria such as income, assets, living space per capita, and 
residence permit are significant (Chen, et al., 2014, p543). Therefore there are substantial 
differences in the distribution process across the major cities and regions of China.   
 
4.2 Social rights 
Subsidy: The subsidisation of housing in China has been evolving, not disappearing, in the 
transition processes. Before reform, the Chinese governments and state-owned factories could 
cover the bulk of housing costs. In the 1990s, the governments offered housing vouchers to 
subsidise the purchase of public and commercial housing (Wang and Murie, 1996). Now 
housing subsidy is only available for social housing. Regional differences in the specific 
formats and degrees of subsidies, such as lower (even free) land costs and tax exemptions to 
developers and price/rent reductions to qualified household, are noticeable. For PRH, both 
Beijing and Shanghai offer tax exemptions to reduce construction costs. However, Beijing 
also tries to control land costs by charging the land usage fee annually instead of collecting it 
in one-go4. In Shanghai, no such subsidies are available (Department of Housing and Urban-
Rurual Development of Shanxi Province 2009).  
       
Regulation: China shares with other Asian counties a strong interventionist tradition in 
housing development processes (Doling 1999). At the national level, China has ‘Medium-to-
long Term Development Plans’, and the ‘Five-Year Plans’. The 12th Five-Year Plan has an 
explicit chapter (Chapter 35) on ‘Improving the Housing Standard’ (State Council 2011). 
State control of land and finance ensures the deliverability of these national regulations: for 
urban land, the monopolistic development right held by the state facilitates its macro-control 
on the housing market (Duncan 2007). Tightened land supply partially contributed to land 
speculation and hence housing price fluctuations (Feng et al, 2011). For finance, the four 
largest banks in China are all state-owned and supervised by the People’s Bank of China 
(PBoC) (Deng and Fei 2008). Therefore in understanding likely housing policy outcomes, it 
is not enough to just observe switches from state to market, but essential to know how states 
regulate, subsidise and tax to achieve housing and other ends. 
 
Growing localism in China, understood broadly as deregulation and decentralisation, offers 
local governments increased autonomy in tailoring local regulations. Since interest rates and 
major tax rates are still decided by Beijing, land provision and planning becomes the most 
important tool that local governments use to manipulate the housing market. OECD (2015)’s 
Economic Survey of China revealed that land sales revenue, a buffer used by local 
government to shield fiscal risk from local debt, was over 30% of the total local revenue 
generated in 2013. Chongqing and Hubei in particular had the highest share of land revenue 
(figure 4). To raise land revenue, local governments could influence either the prices or the 
quantities. Generally speaking, inland regions mainly boost land revenues by increasing sales 
                                                          
4 In China, the maximal land usage period for residence housing is 70 years. Developers often need to buy out 
the land usage right in one go when bidding for it.   
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volumes while coastal regions are more likely to restrict sales and push up prices. Deng et al. 
(2015) found that in many large cities, land prices had risen much faster than the house price 
(table 1). But this difference was higher in first-tier cities, such as Beijing, Shanghai and 
Guangzhou. 
 
Insert Figure 4 here: Revenue from land sales as percentage of sub-national fiscal revenue 
2013 
 
Insert Table 1 here: Land and house price growth rates in12 major markets, 2004-2014 
 
4.3 State-market-family relations  
Finance: Both households and developers are increasingly seeking finance from the banks. 
On the demand side, Chen, Stephens and Man (2014, p12) pointed out that the outstanding 
balance of home mortgages increased by more than 250 times between 1997 and 2009. In 
2010, mortgage loans accounted for around 80% of total household debt, reaching over six 
trillion RMB (Carbo-Valverde et al. 2013, p35-6). The subsidised Housing Provision Fund 
(HPF) is another financial source for urban employees. The saving-loan pool for HPF is 
formed by compulsory savings of employees as a proportion of their incomes (around 5%) 
and matched by employers (Yeung and Howes 2006). PBoC (2007) noted that the total HPF 
loan originations in 2006 reached 380 billion RMB, about one-fifth of commercial mortgage 
loan originations. Therefore despite the favourable interest rates of HPF loans, commercial 
mortgage loans are now the dominant source for China’s urban dwellers. On the supply side, 
Chinese developers seemed to be able to source their own funds (about 70%). But adding 
indirect bank loans, they actually relied on the banking system for over 55% of their financial 
needs (higher than the international norm of 40%) (Baidu Library 2011). The strong State 
presence in China’s financial system means that it can exert direct, significant influence over 
the behaviour of both households and developers (Li 2010; Zhang 2000). For example, in 
order to curtail soaring housing prices in 2010, the State Council (2010) set up an incremental 
loan-to-price ratio and mortgage interest rate based on the number and size of properties a 
household held. First-time-buyers had to put down at least 30% deposit if they purchased a 
flat over 90m2. For someone purchasing the second house, the down payment required rose to 
50%, and the interest rate had to be at least 1.1 times of the base rate. On the supply side, the 
financial institutions in China face very strict regulations by the PBoC, which gives them 
limited room for product innovation (or speculation). Mortgage securitisation to individuals 
still does not exist in China, and REITs are embryonic. But their absence, to a great extent, 
sheltered China from the adverse effects of the GFC.     
 
Financial support from family is significant in meeting the housing costs of younger adults. 
According to the Blue Book of Youth (Lian 2014), 24.3% of its survey respondents lived 
with their parents for free. For those who purchased homes, 49.2% obtained a bank mortgage 
through the support of their parents, while 26.1% had houses bought by their parents and 
gifted to them. Both the high household savings rates and the greater inter-generational assets 
transfer underpin a significantly different financing model of entering home ownership in 
China compared to many Western countries, such as in Western Europe and North America..      
 
Supply: The nature of providers in the housing construction process has changed over time. 
State and collective-owned companies were the dominant housing constructors until the end 
of the 1990’s. In the new century, domestic private companies have been taking the upper 
hand and squeezed out the traditional investment sources from Hong Kong, Macao and 
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Taiwan (figure 5). It is now a common practice for governments to out-source social housing 
construction to domestic private developers.   
 
 
Insert Figure 5 here: Number of Real Estate Developers with different ownerships 
 
 
Demand: Urban housing demand in China was historically masked by non-price allocations 
of public housing. State-owned factories, or ‘work-units’, usually functioned as the broker 
between the states and individual families. Their specific roles had been evolving, not 
necessarily reducing, over time (Wang and Murie 1996; Wu 1996). It was at the end of the 
1990s that individuals became the major direct consumers of housing (National Bureau of 
Statistics, 1996). Disposable incomes, coupled with family support, determined effective 
housing demand. Households’ propensities to invest/speculate in housing assets also appear 
to grow significantly. The China Household Finance Survey (2014, p3) found that in 2011, 
15.9% of urban households had more than one property mainly for investment purpose. By 
2013, this figure had risen to 18.6%, and by March 2014, it had climbed to 21.0%. A 
consequence of this speculation is high vacancy rates. In 2013, 17.3 % of these secondary or 
third homes were left vacant throughout China. Figure 6 shows the regional differences in 
overall housing vacancy rates. The first-tier regions tended to have higher vacancy rates than 
inland regions, which might reflect the higher speculation composition there. The 2008 
financial crisis nevertheless seemed have squeezed out some of these housing bubbles. 
 
 
Insert Figure 6 here: Regional Housing Vacancy Rates between 2002 and 2009 
 
 
Such speculative investment unavoidably pushed up overall housing prices, so low-to-middle 
income households were often left in difficulties meeting their real housing needs. In 2005, 
for example, the ratio of housing prices to urban households’ disposable income reached 
16.4. After a series of market adjustment measures, the State managed to cool down the 
housing market, but this ratio remained high at 11.5 in 2012 (National Bureau of Statistics, 
2014). 
 
Regional variations in housing market outcomes (price burdens) are significant. Figure 7 
compares the annual growth of house price and household incomes for major cities. In 
general, housing prices grew faster than incomes. First-tier cities, such as Beijing, Shanghai 
and Guangzhou, stood out as outliers with housing prices increased much faster than 
incomes; less-favoured cities, such as Taiyuan and Nanchang, faced smaller housing market 
pressures.   
 
 
Insert Figure 7 here: House price appreciation and income growth comparison (35 major 
cities, 2006–10) 
 
 
Different features of the market and non-market systems we outlined in section 2 could be 
observed at particular times and in particular regions of China, as such the ‘middle ground’ of 
housing system is temporally and spatially defined, which highlights the importance of a long 
term effort in recording and monitoring housing system changes. Furthermore, with the case 
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of China we demonstrated the limitations of the EA approach. First, the adoption of specific 
housing policies by the Chinese government in certain period was shaped to serve its overall 
economic and social development strategies, i.e., housing policy regimes are impacting and 
impacted by the ‘big outcomes’. Second, we demonstrated that a rising private 
homeownership does not always correspond to the withdrawal of the State – there were 
backwards-and-forwards efforts to maintain social wellbeing in China amidst the 
continuously rising homeownership rates. Therefore tenure based descriptions are too crude 
to be effective proxies to demonstrate how housing changes and welfare outcomes are 
evolving. Last, significant regional differences within China were noticeable in most of the 
housing indicators we discussed here. Our call to pay attention to the transition trajectories of 
local housing regimes is justified.    
 
5. Conclusion  
 
This paper responds to Wang and Murie (2011)’s call for a rethink of the ‘middle ground’ in 
housing transitions by reflecting on the conventional Esping-Andersen approach. Firstly, we 
argued that the EA approach has been overwhelmingly devoted to changes in social-political 
structures rather than housing outcomes. Secondly, we advocated a de-emphasis on tenure 
change as guide to transition processes with a new emphasis on system functioning indicators 
and outcomes. Finally we argued that, in line with an evolutionary perspective and a growing 
prevalence of localism, it was critical to consider the growing diversities in policy regimes 
emerging within nations. 
 
In this paper, we tried to take one step forward by linking the EA approach to Mayo’s work 
on housing indicators, and suggested some ‘ideal’, or prototype indexes that might be 
developed to describe system change between the polar cases of pure market and pure state 
regimes. These could usefully be refined to form the basis of future research on housing 
system management and evolution. The broad approach was illustrated by exploring the 
economic and social rationale underpinning China’s housing reform as well as its 
consequences. We noticed that more open, deregulated, local housing systems are more 
subject to non-local and global shocks (increasingly noticeable in China), which is suggestive 
of the need for a theoretical perspective that is not reductionist and nation-focused, but 
captures the interaction between different geographical scales and associated orders of 
government autonomy. Across regions and nations, the middle ground is sufficiently diverse, 
and the range and intensity of interventions in housing markets are so dissimilar that the 
simple labelling of change as ‘neo-liberal’ is reductionist and potentially misleading.  
 
We highlighted the necessity for a new summative, spatially variable (although we didn’t 
have the space to deal with it in this paper), system of indicators in housing studies. We 
sketched the key features of the ‘ideal’ social and market systems. Correspondingly, changes 
in non-market and market systems are traceable via the proportions of finance sources, actors 
in housing provision, construction and distribution, level of market control, affordability and 
social housing commitment and coverage. Although further work is needed to conduct such 
comparisons, we have in this paper examined the housing system evolution of China beyond 
the single index of tenure. Based on a combination of different indexes such as housing 
provision, construction, distribution and ownership, we were able to delimit the hybrid and 
regionally varied formats of China’s journey across the ‘middle ground’ of housing policy 
regimes, and conclude that forcing China’s changes into any of the typical categories of 
regimes misses the complex, evolutionary processes involved.  
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Our conclusion is that the compound housing systems in China are not the prototype regimes 
discussed in the Western literature, nor are they unified with the East European models 
(Stephens 2010). China has its unique high growth rate and experimental transformation 
approach, which has seen the emergence of different hybrid regimes without, as yet, a 
singular standard welfare system. It might be a matter of time before such a standard regime 
emerges, but for now, we believe this is a substantive matter of differences that research 
needs to appreciate. The high growth speed and reform efforts in other BRICs, as detailed in 
Maclennan et al. (2014), raises similar questions for these countries. Follow-on work is 
needed to test this framework further.          
 
Last, we believe that housing studies has to give more attention to the local dimensions in 
which housing systems operate. Housing systems are inherently spatial and they are also 
often multi-level in their governance arrangements. Accounts have to consider regional 
varieties in regimes and to recognise the approaches in which multi-order governance are 
reconciled, or left disconnected. Housing systems also unfold over time and we argue for a 
much closer account of the evolutionary properties of housing systems and the significance of 
path dependency. Moreover, along with the growing urbanisation rate (especially in 
developing countries) and the agglomeration of population in urban settlements, housing 
pressures are likely to be more severe in metropolitan areas compared with their rural 
hinterlands. Such agglomeration, coupled with the local embeddedness of the housing 
system, its inherited slowly evolving processes, and its growing demands on household 
incomes call for a central consideration of housing within the understandings of both urban 
change and strategic urban management. Confined by space, we had to leave behind this 
discussion, but believe that future work on housing system transformations has to build on 
from its welfare policy roots and be set within conceptual, empirical and policy frameworks 
that operate at local-metropolitan rather than national scales.        
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